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3
Technology and the Tributaries of Relational Being
Kenneth J. Gergen

My concern with historical transformations in the conception of self has
its own history. Its earliest traces can be found in my 1973 essay, “Social
psychology as history,” where I proposed that as scientiic accounts of
the person enter society, so can they alter the commonly shared visions
of self. Authoritative accounts of brain determination of human action,
for example, can shit the way in which we understand ourselves and our
behavior. he sense of self, in this case, becomes no more than an artifact
of brain stimulation. And with shits in understanding, so are the cultural
mores set in motion and institutional policies transformed. Such concerns
gained momentum in the later development of social constructionist theory (Gergen, 1994), and its focus on the historical and cultural lodgement
of self-understanding (see, e.g., Graumann & Gergen, 1996). Most central
to the present essay, however, was my 1992 book, he Saturated Self. his
work was centrally concerned with the twentieth century emergence of
communication technology and its potentials for transforming the common conception of self.
My particular focus in this work was on the Western tradition of individualism in which the origins of action are traced to psychological processes within the person. For much of Western culture, the concept of the
individual self – the conscious and cognizant agent of action – is more
or less accepted as a natural fact. In courts of law we hold individuals
responsible for their actions; in educational settings, we hold individuals
responsible for their work; in therapy we treat individual sufering; and in
our democracy each individual is endowed with the right to a vote. Yet,
this concept of the individual agent is also peculiarly Western and largely
a by-product of cultural developments emerging in the seventeenth and
culminating in the twentieth century (see, e.g., Seigel, 2005; Taylor, 1992).
It is a view to which philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, and Kant
66
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made major contributions, but that was also nurtured by the development of a merchant class, the Reformation, the ultimate development of
democracy, and the conception of empirical science. Sampson (2008) and
others have coined the term “self-contained” in referring to this conception of the self; elsewhere (Gergen, 2009) I have used the metaphor of
“bounded being.” he main argument is that with the emergence of a new
range of communication technologies, this traditional vision of the self is
fading from the cultural landscape.
hese developments irst undermine the social supports necessary to sustain a stable and compelling view of the self. Traditional communities could
be characterized in terms of their high degree of stability, reiterative communication patterns, shared beliefs and values, mutual support, and shared
knowledge about the participants. With the advent of the radio, the automobile, rapid transit, mass publishing, television, jet transportation, and the
Internet in particular, the traditional community has been placed in jeopardy.
All of these technologies functioned to remove individuals from their location within the community. Such removals are both physical (through mass
transportation, jet transportation, etc.) and psychological (through radio,
television, the Internet, etc.). As workers of the nation become increasingly
mobile, executives become increasingly global, and the activities of mothers and children are more widely dispersed (supermarkets, district schools,
ater-school activities), the population of active and available neighbors is
substantially reduced.
Community dissolution is matched as well by the demise of its heart,
namely the nuclear family. In many homes in the United States there are
multiple televisions in the house – so that each family member can dwell
in a separate symbolic ethos. here are alluring possibilities for the young
to live private lives in their tech-furnished bedrooms – CD players, computer games, cell phone, ampliied guitar, and so forth. here is oten a
family computer as well, with high competition among family members
for Internet access. Many households harbor multiple laptops, so that even
when they share the same dwelling, each family member can live in a separate social world, each with its own constructions of the real and the good.
Yet, we may ask, if we are witnessing the slow demise of the individualist tradition, how are we to understand its replacement? What new trajectory can we discern in the contemporary landscape of cultural life? his
is scarcely a simple question and continued relection is essential. In what
follows I make a case for a shit from an individualist to a relational conception of self. However, as I propose, this shit is not uniied. Rather, the
general low is constituted by a range of qualitatively diferent tributaries,
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each related to particular developments in technology. In the present ofering I sketch out three movements toward relational being: the unbounded
self, the encapsulated self, and the playing self. My attempt here is not to be
deinitive but to glimpse movements in action, so as to better contemplate
our possible futures. With these trajectories in place, it will be useful to consider the emerging conditions of cultural life that may be favored.

The Unbounded Self
While the emerging technologies of communication undermine the common conception of individual, autonomous agents, they also turn attention
toward relationships. By the mid-twentieth century, automobiles, radio,
ilm, television, mass transportation, and intercontinental air travel had all
opened massive new vistas of connection. “Over there” was now “in the living
room.” With the development of the Internet there was a radical expansion
in the availability of low-cost means of learning about and/or communicating with people from around the globe. Electronic mail, websites, blogs,
games, music, art, live conversations, and other resources travel around the
world on an instantaneous basis. here are now well over a billion users of
the Internet world wide, most of them relying on e-mail communication.
In the United States, more than 70 percent of the population now relies on
Internet services, and by the time it takes to read this paragraph, more than
5 million e-mail messages will have moved through cyberspace. It is estimated that today there are more than 500 million websites, with the amount
of information accumulating each year equaling 30 feet of books per person
for the entirety of the world’s population. he average Internet user in the
United States now spends approximately 100 hours a month online. More
recently, however, these developments have been augmented by the massive
explosion of social media. On Facebook alone there are almost 650 million
visitors during any given month, twice the size of the U.S. population.
In all of these contexts new relations are formed and afective bonds
oten created outside one’s immediate social surrounds. Increasing numbers of people come to “matter,” even if this mattering is oten leeting and
supericial. Each relationship may also invite subtle (and sometimes not so
subtle) shits in one’s manner of being. In this sense, identity becomes luid,
shiting in a chameleon-like way from one social context to another. here
is no coherent community to recognize and support an obdurate sense of
identity. Rather, one’s sense of self becomes subject to a multitude of tangentially related others, each of whom may bring forth and airm a diferent “me.” he boundary of what is and what is not self begins to erode.
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here is also little reason in this context for “looking inward” to locate
“one’s true self.” his once-signiicant question ceases to be relevant to
ongoing participation in social life. he fascination with “inward depth”
is replaced by curiosity in the next arrival of an e-mail message, cell
phone text, or tweet. Indeed, for the newer generations the very idea of a
core-self turns strange. Nor are there close companions available for reliable, in-depth explorations of the “inner region of the self.” Increasingly
we are strung out across the continents, electronically and geographically
mobile, and increasingly overcommitted to numerous relations, projects,
and desires. As the sense of self as bounded, privatized, and centered is
undone, so does the relational matrix become central to daily existence. he
Enlightenment paean to individualism, “I think, therefore I am” is replaced
with “I am linked, therefore I am.” his is not to say that the sense of self is
fully absorbed into the relational low. Rather, one may envision here the
development of a range of partial or fragmented selves. For example, as
one moves from one website to another, one is immersed in a range of contrasting realities. From the Al Jazeera website one may absorb certain Arab
logics and values; from the Conservative Outpost, a dash of right-wing
Republicanism; from the ACLU, the latest on the protection of free speech;
from YouTube, zaniness from around the world, and so on. Nor is it simply
a sense of learning in multiple worlds. In addition, one comes to appreciate
many ideal ways of being. One may variously identify with a range of others who seem gited or honorable in one form or another – in politics, pop
culture, sports, religion, scholarship, and more. One’s range of aspirations
expands. With this continuous expansion in the dimensions of relational
engagement, the sense of a bounded and coherent self slowly gives way to
a “multiphrenia” of partial and conlicted senses of self. I become a multibeing (Gergen, 2009) who brings to any situation an enormous range of
potentials.
With these accretions in potentials for saying and doing, there is also an
increase in one’s capacity for sensitive coordination in other relationships
and similarly with millions of others around the world. he potential for
efective coordination expands exponentially. he result is not only a profound increase in ongoing connectivity, but the world’s peoples also become
increasingly capable of efective collaboration. And with increased capabilities, so does global organizing become increasingly efective. he small business can expand, a medium-sized business can develop markets abroad, and a
large business can go global. Increased organization takes place at all levels –
the community, the state, the regional, the national, and the international.
here is a globally expanding network of police that parallels the expansion
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of globally organized crime and terrorism. To appreciate the rate of growth
in international organizing, consider that in 1950 there were estimated to be
approximately a thousand non-governmental organizations in the United
States with active, intercontinental programs. here are currently more than
60,000 such organizations. It should come as little surprise that there are
more than 12 million websites now treating the importance of collaboration
in the workplace. In efect, the unbounded self thus lends skills to forms of
organizing that further expand the movement toward relational being.
Yet, we must not conclude that the future of unbounded being is altogether rosy. In the “un-bounding” there is let behind in most cultures of
the world at least one of two possible traditions. For those who reside in
highly individualistic societies, as in the West, the tradition of the uniied
and self-contained agent will continue at the edge of consciousness, whispering admonitions about one’s shallowness, spinelessness, and inauthenticity. At more painful moments, the unbounded self may be torn between
allegiances, unable to make a decision. Rather than confronting oppressive
forces, there may be few resources to muster in the service of resistance.
And there will be desolate times when the unbounded self may feel without
deep and reliable connection to anyone.
For those who issue from more collectivist cultures (oten associated
with the non-Western world), there is the continuing voice of one’s origin group at one’s side – whether familial, communal, ethnic, or religious.
his can variously be a voice of disappointment, distrust, love, irritation,
and rejection, as those who have been “let behind” do not so easily part
with their members. And, as those who live an unbounded life may become
aware, once immersed in the global lows of relationship, one can seldom
return to the communal home with full and satisfying presence.

The Encapsulated Self
A major result of communication technology has been a radical expansion
in the extensity and intensity of relational life. As proposed, one signiicant result of this shit is the subtle replacement of the individualist vision
of longstanding with a consciousness of relational embeddedness. Yet, as
I have characterized this conception thus far, it is one of unbounded relations. One moves from a centered sense of self to a vision of an ininite and
continuously moving engagement in relating. his view fails to take into
account another signiicant feature of the same communication technologies, namely their potentials for arresting the low of relationships. By this
I mean that the available communication technologies also enable people

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Library, on 22 Feb 2018 at 19:45:42, subject to the Cambridge
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139035217.005

Technology and the Tributaries of Relational Being

71

to remain insulated within cocoons of meaning. hese technologies permit
people to locate others who hold similar values and visions of the future.
Such connections may be maintained on a continuous basis, with virtually
instantaneous access. Support for one’s views and values is available at every
turn, giving comfort to one’s perspective and/or way of life, and thus inviting one to “remain secure in the fold.” As an example, anyone interested in
the neo-Nazi movement, Aryanism, or white supremacy can now locate
more than a dozen websites that will enable connections to form across
the Western world. hese sites ofer various conversation groups, periodic
meetings, written materials, and even a dating and mating service. One may
remain easily encapsulated within the community.
Yet, although the number of Web-based communities is enormous, it
is the mobile phone that demands more speciic attention. As I have elsewhere proposed (Gergen, 2002) the mobile phone is of unusual importance
because it is almost unique as a technology of communal restoration. It
ofers the possibility for continuous and instantaneous reconnection of participants within face-to-face groups. Within moments, relationships are reenlivened, common opinions and values shared, expressions of support and
mutual understanding enhanced, and knowledge of the other deepened.
In a Bakhtinian sense, while most of the broadly shared technologies are
centrifugal in their efects, disrupting and dispersing conventional systems
of meaning, the mobile phone tends to function centripetally. It reinforces
the commonalties and secures them more steadfastly. It signiies the importance of connection as opposed to autonomy, looking outward rather than
inward, toward network as opposed to self-suiciency.
Yet, this restoration of community deserves closer examination. For we
are not witnessing here a re-lowering of the traditional face-to-face community. Rather, to borrow a descriptive phrase from nineteenth century
Japan, we are witnessing the emergence of “loating worlds.” As in the
Japanese case, it is a world of social interchange that escapes the control
of government and military/police authority. People are free to speak of all
matters great and small, regardless of whether they are lovers exchanging
sighs of longing, family members arranging a rendezvous, or drug dealers negotiating sales. It also resembles the loating world of Edo, Japan, in
its functioning around an axis of petty pleasure. In large degree, mobile
communication is informal, unscripted, and used in ways that enhance the
pleasures of relationship (e.g., romance, friendship, family life, colleagueship.) Lovers or spouses may call each other several times a day, using justiications that seem only to mask the enjoyment that is their aim. As Puro
(2002) has described Finnish mobile phone users, they seem to “create an
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obligation for talk without a reason for a talk” (p. 27). Finally, as in the
Japanese case, there is no stable center of communal life. here is no speciic
geographical location or membership group to which the concept of community can be attached. he community is always there in a potential state,
brought into being only in those moments when two or more participants
are in communication.
Yet, unlike the Japanese case, the loating world of mobile phone users is
not geographically grounded. he loating world of the mobile phone user
is approaching the point of geographic irrelevance. Its participants may virtually be anywhere at any time. Like the hovercrat or the pneumatic rail
system, they are elevated from the physical terrain; there is no speciic location with which they can be identiied. More broadly, it may be said that
the mobile phone lends itself to the pervasive state of an absent presence,
the continuous presence at hand of friends, family, and colleagues who are
physically absent.
In efect, there are dwelling about us at all times numerous small communities that are unseen and unidentiiable. As we stroll the thoroughfare or sip
cofee in a cafe their presence may be made known to us. Each mobile phone
conversation is a sign of a signiicant social nucleus, stretching in all directions, amorphous and protean. We cannot reach out to touch the nucleus,
behold it directly, or interrogate it. Yet, it may lie somewhere toward the center of importance – guiding virtually all the actions of those who are near.
I point to the importance of these interchanges because they oten issue
from tightly knit micro-communities. he ways in which mobile phone
communication enhances and sustains group connection has been the subject of broad commentary. For example, Ling and Yttri (2002) describe the
way in which the cell phone enhances “micro-coordination,” the capacity
of people within the circle to adjust their actions to each other and move
together harmoniously as a unit. here is also the use of the phone in what
they term “hyper-coordination,” or the integration of the group in terms of
emotional expressions and self-deinitions. As Gournay (2002) describes it,
the mobile phone moves us toward “fusional” relationships, in which “the
inner circle” is vitally strengthened. As Fortunati (2002) puts it, the mobile
phone is “a strong booster of intimacy among those within the social network of the user” (p. 51). With continuous communication, those within the
circle can develop a high degree of mutual trust and support.
It is also important to note that the new loating worlds are nicely
adapted to the demands of life in a highly complex, rapidly moving, hightech society. his is so irst because participants can rapidly obtain information from those within the circle as the demands of the day (or night)
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unfold. One can obtain directions, advice, support, and the conidence of
shared opinions and values. Or, if one suddenly learns or recalls information useful to another within the circle, this can be transmitted at once.
his close interdependency also lends itself to micro-social fragmentation.
As the small group consumes an increasing proportion of communication
time, issues not inherent to group interests lose salience. As small group
concerns are intensiied, so are demographic divisions pressed to the margins of consciousness. he problems, challenges, and possibilities of the
micro-structure diminish concerns with broad societal schisms. Microsocial concerns and conlicts become focal. In Gournay’s (2002) terms, “We
are seeing a desire for closure of the relational network, reduced to a few
close friends and the family core” (p. 202).
Similar to the case of unbounded being, we ind here an incipient diminishing of the autonomous, agentive self so central to the Western tradition.
Replacing this traditional sense of self is an abiding consciousness of connection. Again, this newly emerging subjectivity is not without its problems. As Turkle (2011) suggests, participation in these social enclosures can
generate a need for continuous validation. “Am I ok? Am I making the right
choice here? What will they think?” One becomes helplessly dependent on
social airmation. Further, as Turkle proposes, there may be little nourishment here for what she feels are deeper needs for intimacy. Ultimately, she
proposes, participants in the 24/7 world of connection may begin to look to
technology itself as a replacement for human relationships.
Of course, it is diicult to fathom the trajectories that may emerge as
technologies of communication develop. However, that the need for validation threatens one with a sense of helplessness is a problem only if “helplessness” itself is devalued. With continued immersion in one’s bounded circles,
the desired state may ultimately become that of “rocking in the cradle” of
continuous airmation. And what may seem to be “deeper needs for intimacy” may simply be a historically situated construction, slowly decaying
in the new age of technology.

The Playing Self
In the preceding accounts of the shiting sands of self-deinition – toward
unbounded and encapsulated relationality – we focused on process without content. hat is, we centered attention on the generalized movement
away from the traditional individualist vision of the self and the emerging
importance of relational being. However, there is a third direction favored
by the emerging technologies that speciically centers on the content of
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communication, and most speciically on play. I expand on my concerns
in this case, as discussions on the unbounded and encapsulated self may be
found in previous writings.
My interest in the cultural shit toward play was sparked several years
ago when my morning newspaper greeted me with a front-page, bannersize headline and photo touting the dramatic win of the city’s professional
football team. he account of the game bristled with excitement. In smaller
print at the top of the page was a report on the winning ways of a local
basketball team. It was only in the nether regions of the page that I discovered reports on national and international afairs, all properly phrased in
the monochromatic hues of impartial objectivity. Struck by the attention
given to matters of sport, I became curious about the general content of the
newspaper. Interestingly, the sports section proved to be substantially larger
than the irst and principle news section. he entertainment section also
exceeded the size of the inancial section. If I subtracted the advertisements
from the pages, the portion of the paper devoted to playful matters was
more than twice that of what one might call serious news. A few months
later, an editorial in the paper opined that the name of this winning football
team “is not only a piece of the town’s history; it also conjures its essence.”
his composition of the news may be commonplace in today’s world.
But it was not so in the world of my youth, nor it seems in previous history.
My curiosity increased. Is a shit in cultural investments now in motion,
and if so, is it an important one? Has play truly become the dominant cultural activity? A scanning of statistics on professional sports in the United
States was provocative: In professional baseball for a recent season, the
gross revenues reached a record-breaking $7 billion. As the Major League
Baseball Commissioner, Bud Selig, announced, “his is the golden era for
the sport, and given the (weak) economy this may be the most remarkable
year we ever had. We’re at numbers nobody ever thought possible.” Paid
attendance at the games was more than 73 million. For professional football,
the revenue that year was almost $8 billion, with 26 million paid fans and
a television audience of at least 500 times this number. hen there are the
basketball and hockey seasons to consider, among others. Considering the
professional sports industry in the United States altogether, the gross revenues in 2010 reached $414 billion. his igure exceeded the total revenues of
the combined governments of Costa Rica, India, Lithuania, Bolivia, Chile,
Finland, Morocco, Romania, and Pakistan during the same period. And all
this was to say nothing of the lively interest in golf, tennis, auto racing, and
soccer, along with, skiing, casino gambling, horse racing, gymnastics, skateboarding, online gambling, televised poker, and fantasy sports.
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However, the most dramatic developments are surely in the virtual world.
A homely example is revealing, important as well in suggesting that the shit
toward play is not solely an American phenomenon: When visiting friends
in the Netherlands, I was told that they were to entertain their grandchildren
for the aternoon. Later, the two boys, three and ive, burst into the house, and
without more than a nodding acknowledgment of the assembled gathering,
raced up the stairs. heir destination: the two computers in the upstairs oice.
Within minutes they were both absorbed in online games. hey were allowed
to remain so for an hour, at which point cruel grandmother pulled the switch.
It was human time again. Such an event will scarcely be surprising to any
young parents. At the present time, there are now more than 200 million websites related to computer games. One of these sites, chosen at random, ofers
1,500 games, and has more than 70,000 participants. Another ofers games in
more than 40 languages. Players on the MMOs (massively multiplayer games),
such as those featured on Facebook and other social network sites, cater to
more than 100 million participants a year. he participants spend more than
$1 billion annually. Video games, such as those sold for Xbox, garner far
greater income. Revenues of video games now exceed $20 billion internationally. More than 20 million players have spent 17 billion hours on Xbox Live,
which is more than 2 hours for every person on the planet. Another 40 million
users have registered PlayStation Network accounts.
Among the major characteristics of games, as deined by scholars such
as Huizinga (1938) and Caillois (2001), are that they are non–incomeproducing activities, non-obligatory, and circumscribed in space and time.
Further, as they see it, there are rules of participation (either explicit or
implicit). Participation, in turn, evokes an alternative reality, a reality that
has the capacity to enchant or captivate. Deined in this way, it is legitimate to include within the cultural shit toward play, the shared indulgences in TV drama, movies, YouTube, online porn, pop music, romance
novels, and social networks. As Timmermans (2010) and Pearson (2009)
both describe, online activities such as these are essentially playful. We
may, then, distinguish among three forms of play. First there is Social Play,
constituted by the vast majority of communication taking place in social
networks. Communication in this context not only creates a playful ambience, but is also a site on which people communicate about both spectator and participatory play, thus enhancing their signiicance. Second, there
is Spectator Play, constituted by the vast range of spectator pleasures, as
facilitated by television, movies, magazines, newspapers, and radio. Finally
there is Competitive Play, made up of the enormous range of participatory
competitive games, both electronic and organic.
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Let us characterize the general shit in cultural investments of attention,
time, and money in these three spheres in terms of Playland, denoting a
world in which the dominant cultural activities – along with the meaning these activities give to life – center on participation in various forms of
play. If this lens for viewing cultural life carries legitimacy, numerous questions follow, concerning, for example, the reasons for this historical shit; its
efects on families, communities, and nation; its implications for education
and governance; and so on. However, my chief concern here is the implications of life in playland for the ways in which we come to understand ourselves, and the meaning of our lives.
At the outset, one might well be inclined to see in this movement an
extension and intensiication of the agentive “I.” One might surmise that
most games celebrate the individual strategist, who aspires to success; who
vanquishes; and who trains, plans, schemes, and carries out tactics for
purposes of winning. In the process of playing, personal agency is reiied;
individualism is refurbished. Certain gaming structures certainly lend
themselves to such a result, but in general, I am not persuaded. Consider
again the three forms of cultural play: social play, spectator play, and competitive games. It is in the context of social play that my case for the erosion
of the bounded self and the coming of relational being was signiicantly
based. E-mail, Facebook, cell phones, Twitter, and the like all immerse us
in the co-constituting process of communication. In each case, our actions
are inherently “for the other,” and without the other they lose meaning altogether. To abandon all of one’s interlocutors would eviscerate one’s sense
of self. On the level of spectator pleasure, there is also a diminishment of
the agentive “I,” but the route is diferent. In this case the dominant pleasure is taken from the process of identiication, particularly the spectator’s
fantasized narrative of self as the player. Because the drama of games is one
typically featuring success versus failure or good versus evil, the potential
for games to generate heroic igures is great. Movie and television dramas
yield a similar panoply of “gods” and “goddesses.” As a spectator, the identiication process may remain wholly in fantasy. However, the fantasies also
carry over into purchasing apparel fetishizing the hero, or adopting the
hero’s mannerisms, gestures, or ways of life. he important point is that
when immersed in spectator pleasures, one brackets the sense of authentic
being. One lives temporarily as the other.
In both of these conditions we ind an alteration in consciousness, from
the traditional sense of “I am the master of my actions” to an “out-of-self ”
condition; in the former case, “I am an actor for others” and in the latter, “I
experience as the other.” Let us view these as subtle movements in terms of
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the emergence of a second-order self, a sense of self as other than self, or a
state of para-being. On the more extreme level, the sense of a second-order
self may characterize one’s condition under the inluence of a drug, or when
sexually aroused, romantically infatuated, or fully immersed in a stage role.
One is fully compelled by activities that might be described as ego-alien.
hese activities spin out spontaneously, without deliberate thought, and
oten surprisingly. Now consider the case of competitive games: I watch
as my twelve-year-old grandson sits in a special chair designed for online
gamers. he chair approximates the seat of a jet ighter pilot or a motorcycle
driver. His eyes are fastened on the television screen, his hands grip precision controls for the events unfolding before him, and the booming sounds
of these clamorous events bellow from nearby speakers embedded in the
chair. his is not “John, my studious grandson, with polite manners, tidied
room, and careful eating habits.” hat John is absent, now replaced by a
rampant killer, emptying bullets into dark igures lurking in shadows or
leaping from doorways, casting grenades across barriers to see bodies torn
to bits, moving ever forward to slay as many combatants as possible. his
is the intoxication of a second-order self. All the frustrations, ambiguities,
complexities – along with the possible emptiness – of daily life are removed.
One lives a thrilling life as a hero with a thousand lives, but returns to the
dinner table as dutiful son.
To be sure, this is a dramatized account, and it is clearly more relevant to
some forms of participatory games than others. But virtually all competitive games invite one – for however long an amount of time – to become a
second-order self. he increased presence of second-order being might not
be so important in itself. To play tennis or golf once or twice a week probably has little impact on the remainder of one’s life. One plays, and when play
is terminated, one returns to everyday demands. However, a closer examination is required. here is now substantial literature in the human sciences – from the late nineteenth century to the present – proposing that one
of the major inluences on human development is imitative role-playing. In
their play, children imitate their parents, for example, and in playing out
these roles their personalities and potentials are shaped. In the same way, in
entering a profession one imitates the behavior of other professionals and
attempts to play the role of the professional.
Of special importance to the present chapter, it is out of these processes
that one’s sense of self emerges. In being other, one becomes oneself. Play
gives way to a sense of obdurate identity. Consider again the emergence
of playland: Activities in social networks, as we have seen, invite playing
with one’s identity; spectator activities invite imitation of players; and with
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competitive games one indeed becomes the player. With sustained and
intense participation in playland, the conditions are in place for the emergence of a genuine playing self. he sense of a second-order self gives way to
a irst-order one: “I am a player.”
As the sense of the playing self gains strength, so do states of authentic
being become suspect. To create a series of avatars or game identities poses
little problem; with chameleon-like ease, one its congenially into the game
at hand. Within the individualist tradition, with its emphasis on authenticity, one might choose to play, depending on the outcome; however, as a
playing self, one is simply playing without asking questions of outcome. In
the same way, one does not choose to breathe the air; breathing is just the
nature of life. For the playing self, one who calculates daily decisions about
work and play may seem naïve. To fancy oneself as a rational agent, carefully weighing the outcomes of a decision is foolish: “Don’t you know it’s all
a game?” Richard Rorty’s (1989) conception of the liberal ironist is apt. For
Rorty, propositions about the real and the good are without rational foundations. Yet, those realizing that this is so may nevertheless commit themselves to relieving sufering in the world. hey commit to liberal causes,
understanding full well that there are no knock-down arguments for doing
so, no foundations for commitment. In the same way, in taking issues of life
seriously, the playing self understands that they are not serious. Or as Oscar
Wilde would put it, “Deep down he is supericial.”
As the playing self emerges in cultural life, what are the implications for
daily life? What is worth doing; on what kind of narrative journey is one
embarked? To treat such issues we obviously broaden the realm of interpretive complexity. As commentators we are immersed in the very processes
about which we write; we grapple with understanding a condition that
is not, for us, an object of observation. he hope, however, is that in the
grappling we generate resources for collectively navigating our way. With
this said, it is my view that with the playing self, the strong individualist
account of human functioning recedes. One does not ask, in the abstract,
“what would I Iike to be?” and look inward for the resources to reach this
self-determined end. Rather, one recognizes that one is forever functioning within a relational context, with other players, with rules and expectations, and with oferings of what is possible and what is precluded. One may
ask about preferred ends within a context, but there is no meta-contextual
location from which to take a stand. he playing self is relationally dependent. his does not mean confronting a preixed world, where one can
only play within the boundaries of tradition. On the contrary, because
one understands that one comes into being through playing, and that the
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games are created by players, then new games are always possible. All that
is required is another player responding enthusiastically to the invitation,
“let’s imagine that ….”
he life course for the playing self is thus indeterminate. As Timmerman
(2010) proposes, in the digitalized contexts of the game world the vision of
a coherent life narrative is no longer compelling. he latter vision is a byproduct of a textual world. In efect, the playing self is ideally adapted to
the technologically driven ethos in which change is continuous and rapid.
Living disjunctively is not, then, unsettling. Rather, the ininite possibility
of new and exciting life-games is optimistic and energizing.
Does the playing self thus lack moral iber; is this a spineless creature
for whom anything goes? I do not think so. Rather, one’s existence as a
playing self requires the presence of a game, and games require for their
existence rules of conduct. hese rules, in turn, contain values – what it is
to win and lose, to succeed and fail, to play fairly or unfairly. As mentioned
earlier, most video games are based on a narrative in which heroes are pitted against villains. hus, a world of virtue is built into both the content and
structure of the game. Extrapolating to life outside the game, the playing
self would be prone to a situated ethics. He or she would be sensitive to local
moralities, but would be resistant to transcendent moral principles. his
does mean that because the rules of a game are ultimately arbitrary, and
one ultimately plays to win, situated ethics may run thin. Whether on Wall
Street, the battleield, or in the neighborhood, if winning is at stake, little
else matters. Bending the rules may be a pervasive temptation, with little
investment in grappling with issues of moral ambiguity or integrity.

The Future in View: Between Peril and Prosperity
In the preceding account my special concern has been with three contemporary forms of self transformation. All three of these have in common a strong link with, on the one hand, the profusion of communication
technologies, and on the other, a shit away from the traditional Western
vision of independent and agentive selves. Favored in all cases is a movement toward a relational sense of self. However, depending on the form of
technological immersion, three diferent accents of the relational self can
be detected. Roughly speaking, dependency on social media, including the
World Wide Web and e-mail, favor a sense self cast on a sea of unbounded
relationship. In contrast, a dependency on mobile communication, invites
a more encapsulated sense of relationality. One’s identity is cemented to
the small enclave of interlocutors. Finally, immersion in electronic games
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and related media and networks favors a sense of a playing self. One loses
identity in the ongoing process of “the game.” To be sure, these are analytic
categories, scarcely representing the possible overlaps, synergies, and vast
sectors of a non-participating public. he attempt here has not been to be
inclusive but to ofer resources for relexive dialogue.
It is also important to note that although communication technologies
are surely an important factor in such transformations, their reverberations
do not occur in a historical vacuum. heir ramiications are supplemented
by several additional movements. here is, for one, the impact of global organizing. Although itself drawing from technological developments, movements toward globally organizing business, science, sports, scholarship,
religion, and so on place a strong demand on collaboration. Increasingly,
participants in such movements ind their future depending not on the traditional virtues of self-reliance, character, and autonomy, but on participating harmoniously and efectively in groups. In addition to globalization, the
growing consciousness of environmental catastrophe also places a major
stress on relationship. In the face of global warming, atomic power production, species eradication, dwindling water resources, and the like, we
confront a choice between productive collaboration and catastrophe. he
eforts of isolated individuals are insuicient. here are no land masses that
are exempt from environmental threat. In efect, we realize that a viable
future depends on the collaborative capacity of the world’s peoples.
Although the forces favoring a relational consciousness of self are
prevalent, continuing discussion is also essential concerning the implications for cultural life. Many may lament the erosion in individualism,
once regarded as the cornerstone of American democracy and productivity. Others will be concerned with the threats to traditions of individual
responsibility and possible tyrannies of the collective. At the same time, a
growing number of critics have explored the corrosive impact on individuals and society of what they view as the ideology of individualism (Bellah
et al., 1985; Lasch, 1979; Leary, 2004; Sampson, 2008). As many see it, when
the individual agent is held to be the fundamental atom of society, we set
the stage for narcissism, selishness, alienation, loneliness, self-doubt, and
antagonism. Further, we develop institutions in which competition, judgmental evaluation, and hierarchy prevails. When we hold that it is fundamentally a world of “all against all,” we lean toward global distrust. In this
context, movements toward relational conceptions of the self are much to
be welcomed. hey form a promising alternative to the individualist tradition, one that might form an invaluable resource as we move toward global
interdependency.
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Yet, in my view, there are distinct diferences among these three trajectories in terms of future promise. As we move into a world in which multiple
perspectives, values, and ways of life are increasingly thrown into confrontation, we enter a space that is both dangerous and pregnant with potential. On
the one side, within any reality-making enclave we now have the technological potential to ind 24/7 support. If invested in a religious, ethnic, political,
or business enterprise, for example, our chorus of airmation is never further than a click away. One’s vision of reality, or commitment to a way of life,
need never be questioned. As a result, there may be crystallization and an
accompanying resistance to any alternative reality or way of life. Such resistance may also give way quite rapidly to animosity and its deadly sequelae.
We recognize this condition in the dead-end political conlict infecting our
government, no less than in the religious strife now dominating the globe.
When carried to an extreme we move toward a new level of “all against all,”
one with devastating consequences.
At the same time, we also recognize that the chief origins of innovation
lie within the hybridization of cultures or subcultures. To sustain a given
tradition of reality-making is to circumscribe the possibilities for action. In
bringing traditions together, not only are possibilities expanded, but new
combinations also become apparent. In efect, invention is largely a byproduct of relationship (cf. LeFevre, 1987; Montuori & Purser, 1999). Closely
related, Chua (2007) has argued that the golden ages in many cultures of the
world occur when their various minorities can be brought into collaborative working relations. In short, this is to say that if means can be found to
soten the boundaries among various groups, to explore ainities, to appreciate multiplicities, and to prize the process of collaboration, we may move
in the direction of unprecedented global well-being.
In these terms, what is to be said of the three trajectories described
in this chapter? All of them move toward dissolving the tradition of the
autonomous, self-contained individual. All move toward a greater appreciation and investment in relationship. In this sense, all three could
contribute to the more promising alternative just described. Yet, there are
signiicant shortcomings represented in both the trajectories of encapsulation and play. In the former case, the individual becomes immersed
within the reality and values of a circumscribed group. Everything outside
may become either irrelevant or threatening. he potential for integrating
multiple perspectives is diminished. In the case of the playing self, one
sacriices autonomous selhood for participation in the relational world of
the game. Yet, every game also functions as a bounded world within itself.
And in the case of games, these are worlds generated by others, typically
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for commercial purposes. hus, the playing self may move with ease across
the span of game-worlds. However, there is little invitation here to appreciate or participate in alternative worlds – in their terms.
In terms of world futures, it is thus the general and uncontrolled immersion in technologies of communication that may ofer the best hope for
future well-being. Most valued is the individual who moves freely across
various spaces of relationship, absorbing from all, and emerging as a multipotentialed hybrid. he relational nomad will sufer losses – longing sporadically for the valued traditions that he or she is simultaneously rendering
obsolete. Yet, given the technologies for creating new forms of life, these
explorers of the new social space may just possibly generate life-giving and
life-sustaining alternatives.
References
Bellah, R., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. (1985). Habits of the
heart: Individualism and commitment in American life. Berkeley : University of
California Press.
Caillois, R. (2001). Man, play and games. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.
Chua, A. (2007). Day of empire: How hyperpowers rise to global dominance – and
why they fail. New York: Doubleday.
Fortunati, L. (2002). he mobile phone: Towards new categories and social relations. Information, Communication & Society, 5(4): 513.
Gergen, K. J. (1992). he saturated self. New York: Basic Books.
(1994). Reality and relationships: Soundings in social construction. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
(2002). Cell phone technology and the realm of absent presence. In D. Katz
& M. Aakhus (Eds.), Perpetual contact (pp. 62–81). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
(2009). Relational being: Beyond self and community. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Gournay, C. (2002). Pretense of intimacy in France. In J. E. Katz & M. Aakhus
(Eds.), Perpetual contact: Mobile communication, private talk, public performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Graumann, C. F., & Gergen, K. J. (Eds.) (1996). Psychological discourse in historical
perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Huizinga, J. (1938). Homo ludens. London: Routledge.
Katz, J. E., & Aakhus, M. (Eds.) (2002). Perpetual contact: Mobile communication,
private talk, public performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lasch, C. (1979). he culture of narcissism: American life in an age of diminishing
expectations. New York: W. W. Norton.
Leary, M. R. (2004). he curse of the self, self-awareness, egotism, and the quality of
human life. New York: Oxford University Press.
LeFevre, K. B. (1987). Invention as a social act. Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Library, on 22 Feb 2018 at 19:45:42, subject to the Cambridge
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139035217.005

Technology and the Tributaries of Relational Being

83

Ling, R., & Yttri, B. (2002). Hyper-coordination via mobile phones in Norway. In
James E. Katz & Mark Aakhus (Eds.), Perpetual contact: Mobile communication, private talk, public performance (pp. 139–69). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Montuori, A., & Purser, R. E. (Eds.) (1999). Social creativity, Vols. 1 and 2. Cresskill,
NJ: Hampton Press.
Pearson, E. (2009). All the World Wide Web’s a stage: he performance of identity
in online social networks. First Monday, 14(3). Retrieved from: http://irstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2162/2127 (Accessed May 1, 2013).
Puro, J. (2002). Finland: A mobile culture. In J. E. Katz, & M. Aakhus (Eds.),
Perpetual contact: Mobile communication, private talk, public performance
(pp. 19–29). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Sampson, E. E. (2008). Celebrating the other. Chagrin Falls, OH: Taos Institute
Publications.
Siegel, J. (2005). he idea of the self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, C. (1992). Sources of the self: he making of modern identity. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Timmermans, J. (2010). Playing with paradoxes: Identity in the Web era. Ph.D. dissertation, Erasmus University, Rotterdam.
Turkle, S. (2011). Alone together: Why we expect more from technology and less from
each other. New York: Basic Books.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Library, on 22 Feb 2018 at 19:45:42, subject to the Cambridge
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139035217.005

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Library, on 22 Feb 2018 at 19:45:42, subject to the Cambridge
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139035217.005

